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Young	people	exposed	to	an	epidemic	have	less	trust
in	political	institutions	for	the	rest	of	their	lives
Poor	public	health	policy	leads	to	deeper	distrust,	further	undermining
the	effectiveness	of	public	health	policy,	write	Cevat	Giray
Aksoy,	Barry	Eichengreen	and	Orkun	Saka.
It	is	widely	argued	(by,	inter	alia,	Fukyuama	2020)	that	the	keys	to
success	in	dealing	with	COVID-19	are	“whether	citizens	trust	their
leaders,	and	whether	those	leaders	preside	over	a	competent	and
effective	state.”	By	way	of	example,	Rothstein	(2020)	ascribes	the	greater	success	at	containing	the	COVID-19	in
the	Nordic	countries	than	in	Italy	in	part	to	greater	trust	in	government.
Trust	in	government	is	not	a	given,	however.	Specifically,	there	is	reason	to	ask	whether	COVID-19	itself	will	affect
trust	in	political	institutions	and	leaders.
New	evidence
In	a	new	paper,	we	provide	the	first	evidence	on	the	effects	of	epidemics	on	political	trust.	We	use	individual-level
data	on	confidence	in	political	institutions	and	leaders	from	the	2006-2018	Gallup	World	Polls	(GWP),	fielded	in
nearly	140	countries	annually.	Our	data	cover	some	750,000	respondents	from	142	countries.	We	analyse
responses	to	questions	about	confidence	in	the	government,	confidence	in	elections,	and	approval	of	national
leaders.	We	link	these	individual	responses	to	the	incidence	of	epidemics	since	1970	as	tabulated	in	the	EM-DAT
International	Disasters	Database	(see	Figure	1).	By	incorporating	a	wide	range	of	fixed	effects,	controlling	various
observable	characteristics	as	well	as	past	exposure	to	other	economic	and	political	shocks,	we	can	address
potential	concerns	with	omitted	variables.
Figure	1	–	Average	number	of	people	(per	million)	affected	by	epidemics,	1970-2017
Notes:	This	figure	shows	the	number	of	people	affected	by	epidemics	(per	million),	averaged	across	all	available	years.	Source:	EM-
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DAT	International	Disaster	Database,	1970-2017,	UN	Population	Database,	1970-2017,	and	authors’	calculations.
Building	on	previous	work	suggesting	that	attitudes	and	behaviour	are	durably	moulded	in	what	psychologists	and
sociologists	refer	to	as	the	“impressionable”	late-adolescent	and	early-adult	years,	we	show	that	exposure	to
epidemics	at	this	stage	in	the	life	course	durably	shapes	confidence	in	political	institutions	and	attitudes	toward
political	leaders.	(On	the	“impressionable	years”	hypothesis,	see	Dawson	and	Prewitt	1969	and	Krosnick	and	Alwin
1989.	For	an	economic	application	see	Guiliano	and	Spilimbergo	2014.)
Specifically,	we	find	that	individuals	who	experience	epidemics	in	their	impressionable	years	(specifically	ages	18	to
25)	display	less	confidence	in	political	leaders,	governments,	and	elections.	The	effects	are	substantial:	an
individual	with	the	highest	exposure	to	an	epidemic	(relative	to	zero	exposure)	is	7.2	percentage	points	less	likely	to
have	confidence	in	the	honesty	of	elections;	5.1	percentage	points	less	likely	to	have	confidence	in	the	national
government;	and	6.2	percentage	points	less	likely	to	approve	the	performance	of	the	political	leader.	(The
respective	averages	of	these	three	variables	in	our	sample	are	51	per	cent,	50	per	cent,	and	50	per	cent.)	These
effects	represent	the	average	treatment	values	for	the	remainder	of	life.	They	decay	only	gradually	and	persist	for
two	decades:		the	difference	between	the	median	age	during	impressionable	years	(21.5)	and	the	median	age	in
the	last	subsample	(40.5)	corresponds	to	19	years	(Figure	2).
Figure	2	–	Effects	of	epidemics	in	impressionable	years	over	subsamples	with	rolling	age	windows
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Note:	This	figure	shows	the	persistence	of	the	effects	on	three	main	outcome	variables	by	restricting	the	observations	to	the
respondents	who	are	in	the	26-35	age	range	at	the	time	of	the	survey	(Base	sample)	and	then	repeatedly	rolling	this	age	window
forward	by	one	year	for	each	separate	estimation.	The	plotted	coefficient	is	Exposure	to	epidemic	(18-25)	in	Equation	(1)	in	Aksoy,
Eichengreen,	Saka	(2020).	Confidence	intervals	are	at	95%	significance	level.	Source:	Gallup	World	Polls,	2006-2018	and	EM-DAT
International	Disaster	Database,	1970-2017.
There	is	significant	heterogeneity	in	these	effects.	Less-educated	individuals	respond	more	strongly,	adopting	even
more	negative	attitudes	toward	political	institutions	and	leaders.	Residents	of	urban	areas	respond	more	negatively
than	those	residing	in	rural	areas.	Women	display	larger	drops	in	confidence.	The	negative	impact	of	epidemic
exposure	is	larger	in	middle-	and	high-income	countries.
Amplification	and	transmission
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We	then	explore	amplification	and	transmission	mechanisms.	We	show	that	the	effects	we	identify	are	specific	to
communicable	diseases,	such	as	viruses,	which	can	spread	contagiously	and	where	a	timely	and	effective	public
policy	response	is	critical	for	containment.	For	non-communicable	diseases,	in	contrast,	we	do	not	see	the	same
impact	of	past	impressionable-year	outbreaks	on	subsequent	views	of	the	trustworthiness	of	governments	and
leaders.
In	addition,	individuals	exposed	to	epidemics	in	their	impressionable	years	are	less	likely	to	have	confidence	in	the
public	health	system	and	the	safety	and	efficacy	of	vaccination.	The	former	is	indicative	of	trust	in	the	overall	health
policies	of	the	government,	while	the	latter	can	be	taken	as	reflecting	attitudes	specifically	toward	pharmaceutical
interventions.	These	findings	suggest	that	the	perceived	(in)adequacy	of	health-related	government	interventions
during	epidemics,	both	pharmaceutical	and	non-pharmaceutical,	are	important	for	trust	in	government	more
generally.
Government	strength	matters
In	addition,	the	magnitude	of	the	effect	we	identify	depends	on	the	strength	of	the	government	at	the	time	of	the
epidemic.	When	individuals	experience	epidemics	under	weak	governments,	the	negative	impact	on	trust	is	larger
and	more	persistent.	This	is	consistent	with	the	idea	that	such	governments	are	less	capable	of	effectively
responding	to	epidemics,	hence	leading	to	a	long-term	fall	in	political	trust.
We	substantiate	this	conjecture	by	considering	this	same	conditioning	factor,	government	strength,	in	the	context	of
COVID-19.	We	show	that	government	strength	is	associated	with	statistically	significant	improvements	in	policy
response	time	(the	number	of	days	between	the	date	of	first	confirmed	case	and	the	date	of	the	first	non-
pharmaceutical	intervention).	This	supports	the	notion	that	government	strength	at	the	time	of	the	epidemic	is	a
predictor	of	effective	policy	responses	and	that	its	absence	amplifies	the	negative	revision	of	political	trust	in
response	to	epidemics.
Finally,	we	show	that	our	results	are	driven	by	the	reaction	to	epidemic	exposure	in	democracies.	In	democracies,
residents	sharply	and	persistently	revise	(downward)	their	political	trust	in	the	event	of	impressionable-year
epidemic	exposure.	The	same	is	not	true	in	autocracies.	Evidently,	citizens	expect	democratic	governments	to	be
responsive	to	their	health	concerns,	and	where	the	public-sector	response	is	not	sufficient	to	head	off	the	epidemic
they	revise	their	views	in	unfavourable	ways.	In	autocracies,	in	contrast,	there	may	not	exist	a	comparable
expectation	of	responsiveness	and	hence	no	impact	on	political	trust.	In	addition,	democratic	regimes	may	find
consistent	messaging	more	difficult.	Because	such	regimes	are	open,	they	may	allow	for	a	cacophony	of	conflicting
official	views,	resulting	in	a	larger	impact	on	trust	when	things	go	wrong.
Conclusion
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Trust	and	confidence	in	government	are	important	for	the	capacity	of	a	society	to	organise	an	effective	collective
response	to	an	epidemic.	Yet	there	is	also	the	possibility	that	experiencing	an	epidemic	can	negatively	affect	an
individual’s	confidence	in	political	institutions	and	trust	in	political	leaders,	with	negative	implications	for	this
collective	capacity.	We	have	shown	that	this	negative	effect	is	large	and	persistent.	Its	largest	and	most	enduring
impact	is	on	the	attitudes	of	individuals	who	are	in	their	impressionable	late-adolescent	and	early-adult	years	when
an	epidemic	breaks	out.
In	addition,	epidemic	exposure	in	one’s	impressionable	years	matters	mainly	for	residents	of	democratic	countries.
Residents	in	democracies	sharply	revise	downward	their	confidence	and	trust	in	political	institutions	and	leaders
following	significant	exposure,	whereas	the	same	is	not	true	in	autocracies.	It	may	be	that	citizens	expect
democratic	governments	to	be	responsive	to	their	concerns	and	that	where	the	public-sector	response	is	not
adequate,	they	revise	their	attitudes	unfavourably.	In	autocracies,	there	may	not	exist	a	comparable	expectation	of
responsiveness.	In	addition,	democratic	regimes	may	find	consistent	messaging	more	difficult.	Because	such
regimes	are	open,	they	may	allow	for	a	cacophony	of	conflicting	official	views,	resulting	in	a	larger	impact	on
confidence	and	trust.
The	implications	are	disturbing.		Imagine	that	more	trust	in	government	is	important	for	effective	containment,	but
that	failure	of	containment	harms	trust	in	government.	One	can	envisage	a	scenario	where	low	levels	of	trust	allow
an	epidemic	to	spread,	and	where	the	spread	of	the	epidemic	reduces	trust	in	government	still	further,	hindering	the
ability	of	the	authorities	to	contain	future	epidemics	and	address	other	social	problems.	As	Schmitt	(2020)	puts	it,
“lack	of	trust	in	government	can	be	a	circular,	self-reinforcing	phenomenon:	Poor	performance	leads	to	deeper
distrust,	in	turn	leaving	government	in	the	hands	of	those	with	the	least	respect	for	it.”
This	blog	post	appeared	originally	at	LSE	Business	Review	and	is	based	on		“The	Political	Scar	of	Epidemics,”
EBRD	Working	Paper	No.	245.
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